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Hybrid governance: just new development jargon or a
useful conceptual tool?
Widespread disillusionment with ‘failed state’ perspectives on African governance has drawn 
attention to new forms of order emerging on the ground in areas where the presence of the 
state is weak. The term ‘hybrid governance’ has emerged to refer to these new organizational 
arrangements, incorporating local institutions and popular organizations, which fill gaps in state 
capacity. Related concepts such as ‘governance without government’, ‘twilight institutions’, ‘real 
governance’ or ‘negotiated statehood’ view governance as the outcome of complex negotiations 
between a number of actors, groups and forces.1,2,3,4,5 Instead of focusing on fixing failed 
states, development practitioners and academics are asking new questions about whether more 
appropriate forms of order can be constructed by ‘working with the grain’ of local institutions.6 
Given the burgeoning popularity of hybrid governance in current development thinking, it is 
worth asking if it is just new development jargon or does it provide a useful conceptual tool for 
facilitating more grounded and sustainable systems of organization in fragile parts of Africa?
This question was examined in the context of a recent workshop on hybrid governance organized 
in collaboration between the London School of Economics and the University of Antwerp, and 
attended by academics and practitioners from Europe and Africa (Box 1). Drawing on current, 
empirically grounded research, participants explored the realities of hybrid governance in a range 
of fragile and more resilient African states, including Somalia, the DR Congo, and South Sudan, 
as well as Uganda, Niger, Somaliland, Rwanda and Senegal. Discussion focused on the social 
basis, development objectives, and performance of hybrid institutional arrangements in specific 
governance activities, such as market regulation, and the provision of healthcare, security, 
justice and electricity. The core objective was to clarify what hybrid governance involves, how it 
reshapes regulatory arrangements, and its implications for state capacity, political legitimacy, and 
accountability in contemporary Africa.
Box 1: Workshop ‘Unravelling Public Authority: Paths of Hybrid 
Governance in Africa’ 
A workshop entitled ‘Unravelling Public Authority: Paths of Hybrid Governance in Africa’ 
held at the London School of Economics on 6-7 December 2013 was organized by the 
Department of International Development (LSE) and the Institute of Development Policy 
and Management (IOB) of the University of Antwerp, with significant support from the IS 
Academy Human Security in Fragile States at Wageningen University and the Justice and 
Security Research Programme (JSRP) at the LSE.
1 Migdal, J. and K. Schlichte (2005). Re-thinking the state. In: K. Schlichte (ed.) The Dynamics of States: the formation 
and crises of state domination (Ashgate, Burlington VT).
2 Hagmann, T. and D. Péclard (2010). Negotiating statehood: dynamics of power and domination in post-colonial Africa. 
In: Development and Change 41(4): 539-62.
3 Lund, Christian (2006). Twighlight institutions: public authority and local politics in Africa. In: Development and Change 
37, (4): 685–705.
4 Raeymaekers, T., K.Menkhaus, K.Vlassenroot, (2008). State and non-state regulation in African protracted crises: 
governance without government? In: Afrika Focus 21, 2: 7-21.
5 Olivier de Sardan, J.P. (2008). Researching the practical norms of real governance in Africa. Discussion Paper 5, 
Africa, Power and Politics Programme, Overseas Development Institute.
6 Kelsall, T. (2008). Going with the grain in African development? Discussion Paper 1, Africa, Power and Politics 
Programme, Overseas Development Institute.
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From ideal to functional governance
The idea that there are forms of order beyond the state is nothing new. Hybrid arrangements 
incorporating non-state institutions into formal governance arrangements have been well 
documented in Africa since colonial experiences of indirect rule. What is new is the move 
from state-based ideals of post-colonial order to a more practical emphasis on local non-state 
arrangements already operating on the ground in fragile areas of Africa. This signals a paradigm 
shift from the ‘good governance’ agenda of neo-liberal state building to a focus on ‘arrangements 
that work’. There is a suspension of normative judgements about emerging forms of order 
involving actors or institutions perceived as informal, coercive or corrupt, in favour of a focus on 
practical outcomes in public service delivery under difficult conditions. A surprising array of non-
state actors are carrying out governance functions, including rebel militias engaging in taxation 
and service provision in neglected areas of the DRC7,or public health services in Niger depending 
on bribery and voluntary cleaning services by hospital users.8 Attention is focused on ‘function 
rather than form’ 9 in a context in which suboptimal hybrid arrangements are better than the total 
collapse of services. 
Shift from ‘good governance’ to a focus on 
‘arrangements that work’
Terms such as ‘practical hybrids’10 and ‘practical norms’11 explore alternative values that may 
underpin otherwise worrying hybrid arrangements. Yet the emphasis on practicality risks 
bringing in normative judgements through the back door. Decisions about ‘what works’ often 
reflect international goals of security and stability, or local adjustments to hard times. This may 
attribute a higher level of deliberate agency to what local actors themselves experience as more 
temporary or desperate strategies to access resources, normalizing behaviour perceived by the 
people directly concerned as socially undesirable and sub-optimal. This risks blurring the line 
between coping strategies and socially accepted practices.12 It is important to understand the 
extent to which hybrid arrangements are actually normalized, institutionalized or seen as socially 
legitimate. The focus on practicality may distract attention from the structural factors, policy 
regimes and economic pressures in the wider political economy that constrain alternative options. 
Such pragmatic approaches to governance too easily suggest that these arrangements work for 
everyone, instead of asking for whom these practices work and why, and who pays the price for 
them.
7 Raeymaekers, T. (2013). Robin Hood, the Godfather and Judge Dredd: explaining de facto sovereignty in sub-Sahara 
Africa. Paper presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop.
8 Hahonou, E. (2013). Juggling with the norms: informal payment and everyday governance of health care facilities in 
Niger. Paper presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop.
9 Centre for the Future State (2010). An Upside Down View of Governance. Brighton: IDS.
10 Booth, David (2012). Development as a collective action problem. Addressing the real challenges of African 
governance. Synthesis report of the Africa Power and Politics Programme.
11 Olivier de Sardan, J.P. (2008). Researching the practical norms of real governance in Africa. Discussion Paper 5, 
Africa, Power and Politics Programme, Overseas Development Institute.
12 Helmke, G. and S. Levitsky (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research agenda. In: Perspectives 
on Politics 2 (4): 725-740.
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Hybrid Governance or Hybrid Ungovernance?
While offering mechanisms for filling gaps in state provision, hybrid governance approaches 
also give rise to a number of tensions. How are non-state institutional partners selected? Whose 
interests are served? How does hybridity affect wider concerns about state capacity and 
accountability? An emphasis on the messy nature of state-building can distract attention from a 
more detailed analysis of actual processes and the diversity of possible outcomes. Despite a 
rejection of idealized notions of the state, studies often default to simplistic theoretical models of 
how hybrid orders produce stable political development. Behind an emphasis on historical realities 
is a tendency to gloss over the fact that acceptable political orders do not necessarily result from 
the messy struggles of state building.
Acceptable political orders do not necessarily 
result from the messy struggles of state 
building
Indeed, Tilly himself highlights five different possible paths, including state failure, only one of 
which offers desirable conditions for the population.13 At least two divergent paths of hybrid public 
authority have been documented among rebel groups in the DRC. The Ugandan-backed UPC 
developed into a coercive military junta, while the RCD-ML gave rise to a coercive but capitalist-
friendly oligarchy of militias and local businessmen oriented toward local taxation, minimal 
service provision and integration into global markets.14 The significant involvement of international 
actors in hybrid governance processes further complicates assumptions that messy hybrid 
arrangements can lead to positive processes of state formation. International actors can shift 
the balance of forces away from socially accountable political processes, substituting upward for 
downward accountability in response to resources and monitoring systems.15,16
Other contexts have raised questions about whether hybrid governance actually creates new 
forms of order or simply compounds the realities of institutional pluralism (as highlighted by 
Goodfellow and Lindeman17). Focusing on contrasting experiences of hybrid governance of 
market places in West Africa and the DRC, Box 2 illustrates the contrast between cohesive and 
more chaotic forms of hybridity. In the case of West Africa, the integration of indigenous women’s 
market institutions extends the reach of the state, while in the case of Kinshasa street markets, 
the outcome looks more like ‘hybrid ungovernance’. There is a need to demonstrate rather than 
assume that grafting together incompatible organizational logics or instituting parallel taxation 
systems will lead to the emergence of stable systems of public authority. 
The tendency of hybrid governance approaches to identify particular actors with particular social 
fields or regulatory logics also tends to obscure real-life complexities. The issue of complexity 
13 Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: Evans, P., D.Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, 
(eds.), Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.169-187.
14 Raeymaekers, T. (2013). Robin Hood, the Godfather and Judge Dredd: explaining de facto sovereignty in sub-Sahara 
Africa. Paper presented at ‘hybrid governance’ workshop.
15 Leander, A. (2004). Wars and the Un-Making of States: Taking Tilly seriously in the contemporary world. In: Guzzini, 
Stefano and Dietrich Jung (eds.), Copenhagen Peace Research: Conceptual Innovations and Contemporary Security 
Analysis. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 69-80.
16 Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. 
(eds.), Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.169-187.
17 Goodfellow, T. and S. Lindemann (2013). The clash of institutions: traditional authority, conflict and the failure of 
‘hybridity’ in Buganda. In: Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 51(1): 3-26.
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is not just about the diversity of non-state institutions, but about the multiple linkages between 
state and non-state orders. There is extensive straddling between these spheres by actors 
from both sides. West African market women mobilize official as well as indigenous norms and 
organizations in pursuit of their objectives, and even cultivate links with international organizations 
such as the ILO.18 Conversely, the former Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade cultivated his 
position within the Mouride religious network, while some Mouride religious officials were elected 
to government positions.19 Hybrid governance interventions not only risk disrupting complex non-
state ecosystems, but may strengthen or weaken elements within the state in unpredictable ways. 
However, concerns that engagement with such institutional multiplicity is uncharted territory ignore 
more than thirty years of detailed empirical research on precisely these issues emanating from the 
vast literature on legal pluralism.20
Box 2: Divergent Paths of Hybrid Market Governance
Hybrid governance has played an important role in the large and dynamic open markets 
of West Africa. Women’s market institutions fill important regulatory gaps owing to the 
lack of formal administrative capacity to regulate West Africa’s complex informal markets. 
Market women’s associations enjoy popular legitimacy, and play a key role in taxation and 
dispute resolution. They engage actively with the state, but have demonstrated an ability to 
mobilize widespread popular resistance to excessive taxation, creating an effective basis 
for negotiation. 
From: Prag, E. (2013). West African governance of marketplace: gender and hybrid 
governance in West Africa. Paper presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop. 
In the informal street markets around the Central Market in Kinshasa, DRC, hybrid 
arrangements for tax collection have emerged through collaboration among street traders, 
brokers, local residents and local officials in order to legitimate illegal use of urban public 
space. Illegal street trade has become an important source of local livelihoods and public 
revenue, blurring legal as well as administrative boundaries. Conflicts have arisen over 
who has the ‘right’ to collect taxes in illegal street markets, generating struggles among 
officials of bordering municipalities and a range of unofficial middlemen and brokers. 
Emerging practical norms weaken rather than promote market governance and undermine 
the common good through mounting pollution, congestion and insecurity.
From: Ayimpam, S. and J. Boujou (2013). Hybrid Urban Governance Arrangements? Public 
Space Management and Proliferation of Informal economy in Kinshasa. Paper presented at 
Hybrid Governance Workshop. 
18 Prag, E. (2013). West African governance of marketplace: gender and hybrid governance in West Africa. Paper 
presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop.
19 Babou, C. (2013). Negotiating the boundaries of Power: President Wade, the Muridiyya and State Politics in Senegal, 
2000-2012. Paper presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop.
20 Von Benda-Beckmann, F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, eds. (2006). Dynamics of plural legal orders. Special double 
issue of The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law. Number 53-54.
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Legitimizing Hybrid Governance
Talk of governance beyond the state raises questions about legitimacy. Who defines the 
legitimacy of hybrid arrangements: scholars, international policy makers, states or citizens? 
Hybrid governance perspectives tend to assume that embedded non-state orders are locally 
legitimate by definition. Yet the local legitimacy of non-state orders is often as contentious as that 
of official orders in many African states. Some embedded institutions, such as religious societies 
or market women’s associations, enjoy greater local legitimacy than others, such as mafias or 
criminal gangs.
Who defines the legitimacy of hybrid 
arrangements?
Collaboration with legitimate or illegitimate non-state institutions shapes distinctive paths of 
hybrid governance, which may alleviate or exacerbate instability. The use of informal enterprise 
associations to collect taxes from the informal sector in Ghana and Nigeria is widely regarded as 
legitimate.21 By contrast, the incorporation of coercive ‘witch cleansing’ practices in hybrid justice 
systems in northern Uganda, or rebel militias in local security systems in the DRC, raise serious 
questions of legitimacy, despite being sanctioned by Local Government officials and international 
development organizations.22,23 Efforts to construct legitimacy by granting formal recognition 
to local institutions that fill gaps in basic service provision risk glossing over local struggles 
against unaccountable or coercive systems. Hybrid arrangements with dubious non-state orders 
may create low cost solutions to governance problems in the short run, but risk eroding local 
legitimacy and consent in the long run. This highlights the ‘dark side’ of hybridity, in which violent 
or oppressive social practices become embedded in officially recognized governance systems.
21 Joshi, A. and J. Ayee (2008). Associational Taxation: A Pathway into the Informal Sector. In: D. Brautigam, O.-H. 
Fjeldstad and M. Moore (eds.), Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
22 Allen, T. and K. Reid (2013). Justice at the margins: witches, poisoners and social accountability in northern Uganda. 
Paper presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop.
23 Raeymaekers, T. (2013). Robin Hood, the Godfather and Judge Dredd: explaining de facto sovereignty in sub-Sahara 
Africa. Paper presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop.
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Hybrid Governance and State Building
A comparison of hybrid governance arrangements in fragile and more stable states advances 
our understanding about how hybrid governance works. There are important differences between 
fragile political orders such as DRC and South Sudan and more successful hybrid orders found 
in Somaliland or Senegal. Processes of hybrid governance tend at best toward a strengthening 
of regulatory coherence and legitimacy, and at worst toward regulatory chaos as state as well 
as non-state actors manipulate normative arrangements and compete over regulatory authority. 
These differences are not necessarily points on an evolutionary continuum, but can reflect distinct 
trajectories of hybrid authority.
Processes of hybrid governance tend at 
best toward a strengthening of regulatory 
coherence and legitimacy
In fragile contexts, local populations or state actors are often not the key decision makers in the 
constitution of hybrid arrangements. Though often invisible in accounts of hybrid orders, a range 
of international actors beyond the state, including Aid agencies, multinational corporate interests 
and foreign governments wield considerable influence in defining hybrid governance priorities and 
outcomes. In South Sudan, international financial institutions and foreign insurance companies 
exert considerable leverage on local bureaucrats, traders, military patronage networks and state 
elites in reshaping taxation arrangements and social insurance systems. In the DRC, donors, 
international mining interests and foreign governments ally with rebels and civil society groups 
in defining hybrid arrangements. Struggles over the boundaries of public authority are as much 
about international demands and strategies as about local political aspirations.
A range of international actors beyond the 
state  wield considerable influence
However, even in fragile contexts, authoritative resources and practices of the state continue to 
shape the terms on which non-state practices can be integrated into governance arrangements. 
Even in a new state such as South Sudan, pre-existing legislation, administrative routines and elite 
networks constitute an ‘institutional toolbox’ necessary to legitimate and incorporate non-state 
practices.24 Just as new formal institutions need to be legitimated by anchoring themselves in 
indigenous arrangements,25 new non-state practices must draw on legitimating laws and symbols 
of state authority to justify their authority.26 Despite the pervasive focus on function, form also 
matters in the constitutions of hybrid arrangements. However, vulnerability to crises can create 
institutional ruptures or ‘open moments’ that widen the space for radical rather than negotiated 
institutional change.
In hybrid systems involving capable states, the influence of international powers and Aid 
organizations is reduced, while state authority constitutes a more influential actor in defining and 
shaping hybrid arrangements. Indeed, the success of the Somaliland state is often attributed 
24 Twijnstra, R. Titeca, K. (2013). Everything changes to remain the same? State reform in South Sudan. Paper 
presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop.
25 Douglas, M. (1986). How Institutions Think. New York: Syracuse University Press.
26 Lund, Christian (2006). Twilight institutions: public authority and local politics in Africa. In: Development and Change 
37(4): 685-705.
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to the comparative absence of Aid agencies and foreign involvement.27 Hybrid arrangements 
with capable states are less about blurring than about a mutual reshaping of the boundaries 
of state and non-state authority through on-going negotiations. In the case of Senegal, hybrid 
governance arrangements between the state and the Mouride Islamic brotherhood have produced 
something resembling a social contract, in which hybridity reinforces rather than undermines 
mutual obligations between the state and society, promoting a measure of tax compliance and 
democratic accountability.28 Similarly, in Somaliland, the sometimes volatile negotiations between 
the state and local businessmen over electricity provision have moved toward defining and 
stabilizing the regulatory boundaries and public responsibilities of state, local private providers 
and consumers. Hybrid arrangements in capable states tend to involve defining rather than 
blurring boundaries between state and non-state regulation.29 Recent efforts by the former 
Senegalese president Wade to blur boundaries between state and the Mouride brotherhood for 
purposes of political capture were felt to weaken both the state and the brotherhood, and were 
resoundingly rejected by Senegalese society.
The value of hybrid governance approaches 
depends on clarifying whether negotiations 
between state and non-state actors are 
shaping a social contract, fragmenting formal 
authority, or empowering illegitimate social 
forces
The value of hybrid governance approaches depends on clarifying whether negotiations between 
state and non-state actors are shaping a social contract, fragmenting formal authority, or 
empowering illegitimate social forces. Negotiations over legitimate boundaries of state-society 
relations seem most effective where capable states face organized local non-state interests, 
and least effective where state as well as non-state interests are self-serving, fragmented, or 
constrained by powerful external agendas. The synergistic, stabilizing trajectory conventionally 
ascribed to hybrid arrangements constitutes only one of a variety of possible outcomes, which 
also include collusion, contestation or predation.30
In addition to identifying distinctive hybrid trajectories, attention is needed to ‘tipping points’ 
between different trajectories, which define when unstable hybrid arrangements achieve 
coherence or tip into chaos. It is argued that broad-based taxation and basic service provision 
entrench stable hybrid systems despite coercive tendencies, as in the case of RCD-ML in the DR 
Congo. However, allowing non-state actors to collect revenue without official authorization can 
fragment rather than stabilize governance, further undermining state capacity. Outside actors 
such as Aid agencies or multinational corporate actors may play a role in destabilizing processes 
of hybridity by supporting compliant non-state actors over state officials without adequate 
attention to the effects on institutional coherence and regulatory contestation.
27 Bradbury, M. (2008). Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey.
28 Babou, C. (2013). Negotiating the boundaries of Power: President Wade, the Muridiyya and State Politics in Senegal, 
2000-2012. Paper presented at Hybrid Governance Workshop.
29 Lochery, E. (2013). Business and state-making in Somaliland’s utility sector. Paper presented at Hybrid Governance 
Workshop.
30 Meagher, K. (2013). Shaping informal economies: typologies of hybrid governance in Africa. Paper presented at 
Hybrid Governance’ Workshop. 
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Hybrid Governance as a Policy Tool
The value of hybrid governance as an analytical and policy tool depends on four important 
considerations:
1. The need to problematize rather than normalize the concept of hybrid governance 
Does it refer to the grafting together of diverse institutional logics, or does it create new 
forms of institutional coherence? Whose interests and strategies shape hybrid governance 
processes? The value of the concept requires moving beyond its normative and often 
functionalist preoccupations, with a view to deciphering actual processes, strategies and 
outcomes. If not, it risks misunderstanding the relation between analytical models and 
empirical reality. 
2. Widening the focus to include international actors 
A range of international actors active in hybrid governance processes are often left out 
of the frame, such as Aid agencies, multinational corporations and foreign governments. 
These actors are particularly influential in shaping hybrid arrangements in fragile states. 
This would also allow attention to different levels of hybridity – not only forms of hybridity 
operating outside the ambit of the state, but hybrid arrangements within the state, or hybrid 
arrangements at the level of international actors such as Aid agencies. 
3. Legitimacy and legitimation 
Public authority is as much about consent as about order. There is a need to move beyond 
assumptions that local non-state orders are legitimate by definition, and to consider the 
basis of their claims to legitimacy. Focusing on the compatibility of hybrid arrangements with 
local norms of legitimate authority, and the extent of their reliance on coercion, is important 
to understanding whether hybrid arrangements are regarded as locally legitimate and by 
whom. Greater attention is needed to processes of legitimation and delegitimation in hybrid 
governance processes, and to the role of institutional entrepreneurs as well as local norms in 
the construction, stabilization or erosion of legitimacy and regulatory authority. 
4. Divergent Processes and Governance Outcomes 
Attention to the diversity of possible trajectories and outcomes of hybrid arrangements 
is critical to understanding the real processes and governance implications unleashed by 
such initiatives. This calls for empirical analyses of process in specific cases, rather than 
assuming outcomes on the basis of potted theory. A more typological approach would be 
useful in tracing the factors shaping divergent paths and outcomes, and examining tipping 
points between different trajectories. This will facilitate a clearer assessment of when hybrid 
arrangements are fostering cohesive systems of public authority and social accountability, 
and when they are contributing to instability and the unravelling of effective public authority.
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